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Risk Attitudes and Well-Being in Latin America
* 
 
A common premise in both the theoretical and policy literatures on development is that 
people remain poor because they are too impatient to save and too risk averse to take the 
sort of chances needed to accumulate wealth. The empirical literature, however, suggests 
that this assumption is far from proven. We report on field experiments designed to address 
many of the issues confounding previous analyses of the links between risk preferences and 
well-being. Our sample includes more than 3,000 participants who were drawn 
representatively from six Latin American cities: Bogotá, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, 
Montevideo, San José. In addition to the experiment which reveals interesting cross-country 
differences, participants completed an extensive survey that provides data on a variety of 
well-being indicators and a number of important controls. Focusing on risk preferences, we 
find little evidence of robust links between risk aversion and well-being. However, when we 
analyze the results of three treatments designed to better reflect common choices made 
under uncertainty, we see that these, more subtle, instruments correlate better with well-
being, even after controlling for a variety of other important factors like the accumulation of 
human capital and access to credit. 
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In 1930, Irving Fisher made a bold claim that has often been taken as a matter of fact in
the policy and academic literatures on economic development ever since. He claimed that,
to paraphrase, people remain poor because their inherent preferences are incompatible with
growth (Fisher, 1930; Thaler, 1997). Since then discussions about attitudes towards risk
(Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1965) have caused the conjecture to morph into a statement often
associated with the “culture of poverty”: people remain poor because they are too impatient
to save and too risk averse to take the sort of chances needed to accumulate wealth.
Despite early economic experiments that found no signiﬁcant link between the risk pref-
erences of poor farmers and wealth (Binswanger, 1980; Sillers, 1980; Walker, 1980) and,
that “poor” rats tended to actually have lower discount rates in an innovative animal study
that exhibited the sort of internal validity not attainable in human studies (Kagel et al.,
1995), this conjecture continues to be the basis of economic models (Lipton, 1968; Katz and
Stark, 1986; Netting, 1993; Banerjee, 2000; Azariadis et al., 2005) and policy (Adubi, 1996;
Holzmann and Jorgensen, 1999; Sinha and Lipton, 1999; Knight et al., 2003).
The importance of this claim about the characteristics of the poor has caused it to
gather considerable empirical attention. In the economics literature, the empirical tests of
the conjecture can be divided into three categories. In one category, researchers begin by
inferring preferences from observed choices and then these preferences are correlated with
wealth or other measures of well-being. The results of this literature are mixed: some
researchers ﬁnd the poor to be more impatient (Lawrance, 1991) and risk averse (Moscardi
and de Janvry, 1977; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993) but others ﬁnd no link between wealth
and discount rates (Ogaki and Atkeson, 1997) and that the self-employed are actually more
risk averse (Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001).
The ﬁrst method has been criticized because wealth or its correlates enter both stages
of the analysis and this might lead to spurious correlation (Lybbert and Just, 2007). This,
however, is not a problemfor the second method which relies on direct measures of preferences
from surveys. Researchers in this category report that people with higher incomes are less
risk averse (Donkers et al., 2001; Hartog et al., 2002) and more patient (Ashraf et al., 2006;
Holden et al., 1998).
While the second method does not suﬀer from the spurious correlation problem, the pref-
erence measures are based on hypothetical questions which might be more prone to various
forms of measurement error (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). The third method of testing
the conjecture suﬀers from neither of these issues. The third group of researchers conducts
incentivized experiments to elicit preferences. In these experiments real money is at stake
2and participants have the incentive to truthfully reveal their preferences. Concerning impa-
tience, some researchers in India and Canada ﬁnd the poor to be more impatient (Pender,
1996; Eckel et al., 2005) but this does not appear to be true in Denmark (Harrison et al.,
2002). In Ethiopia, one study reports the poor to be more risk averse (Yesuf and Bluﬀstone,
2007) but the opposite holds in Spain (Bosch-Domenech and Silvestre, 2006) and among
poor farmers in Chile and Tanzania (Henrich and McElreath, 2002).
A related problem with measures of risk and time preferences is that it is no longer
appropriate to gather just the “standard” measures. Instead of being risk averse, it might
be, for example, that the variation in attitudes towards potential losses (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979) or the aversion to ambiguous situations (Ellsberg, 1961) matters. Concerning
patience, some researchers are now convinced that people have time inconsistent preferences.
The hyperbolic discounting model suggests that people appear to be much more impatient
about decisions with immediate consequences than they are when they think about similar
decisions scheduled to take place in the future (Angeletos et al., 2001).
Aside from the measurement problems with time and risk preferences already mentioned,
there are other problems that make it diﬃcult to say anything deﬁnitive about the relation-
ship between preferences and well-being. Although incentivized experiments may provide the
best quality data on preferences, samples from the lab tend to be small and from convenience
samples of college students which usually lack variation in the important socio-economic char-
acteristics in which we are interested. Even if one is conﬁdent in the quality of the data and
can gather enough to be credible, the relationship between preferences and well-being may
also be complicated by other factors such as the availability of credit (Stiglitz, 1989).
We report on ﬁeld experiments designed to address a number of the problems confounding
previous analyses of preferences and well-being. In this project we focus on the relationship
of experimental risk attitudes, including aversions to losses, ambiguity, the willingness to
pool risks with others and a spectrum of well-being measures (home ownership, basic ser-
vices, employment, overall economic status, perceived relative economic status, requiring
government assistance, expenditures and having lost a business). Our participants faced real
monetary incentives earning the equivalent of two days pay, on average, in 159 sessions. Our
sample is the most extensive and complete assessment of risk attitudes in Latin America
gathered to date; it includes more than 3,000 participants who were drawn representatively
from six Latin American cities: Bogotá, Buenos Aries, Caracas, Lima, Montevideo, San José.
In addition to the experiment, participants completed an extensive survey that provides a
number of important controls for our analysis including demographics and their access to
credit.
As a preview, we ﬁrst show that our experimental procedures replicate many of the
3stylized fact in the related literature: risk attitudes are varied but most people react more
conservatively when the lotteries become ambiguous and less conservatively when losses are
involved. These results continue to hold when we look for city-level diﬀerences; however, we
also ﬁnd that there is signiﬁcantly more risk taking in Caracas than in any other city.
Considering the links between risk-taking and outcomes, we ﬁnd no robust association
between baseline risk attitudes and our measures of well-being. While it is tempting to
consider this an indictment of the “Fisher hypothesis”, we show that interesting associations
do arise when we examine the eﬀects of our treatments on baseline risk attitudes. When
the experiment is changed so that the decision problem is more ambiguous, we ﬁnd that
people who react extremely to ambiguity tend to have lower wealth and fewer basic services
(e.g., running water). Somewhat in contrast, those people who react more risk aversely when
losses become possible have higher home ownership rates, more basic services, and perceive
themselves as having higher wealth. Our most robust experimental manipulation, however,
is when we allow participants to pool risk. Here, among other correlations, we see that those
participants that do not understand the advantage of pooling risk are less likely to own their
homes, have basic services and are more likely to need government assistance to get by.
2 Experimental Design
We discuss four components of a larger set of experiments that took place in six Latin
American capital cities during the spring of 2007. A number of the other components are
discussed in Calonico et al. (2007). Representative samples of individuals fromheterogeneous
urban societies in Bogotá, Buenos Aries, Caracas, Lima, Montevideo and San José were
recruited in the streets and invited to participate voluntarily in a set of economic experiments
with actual and salient economic incentives that averaged about what a worker could get for
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2 - 2 days of work at the minimum wage, or US$10-12 per participant.
Four lottery choices gave us the information necessary to assess participant attitudes
towards risk, ambiguity, losses and risk-pooling. In each case, a participant was shown a
ring of six possible binary lotteries and asked to pick one to play. To minimize any problems
that the participants might have with understanding and assessing probabilities (Kahneman
et al., 1982), the likelihood of good and bad outcomes were equal in each task. Figure 1
displays a version of the baseline graphic used in the ﬁeld that has been redrawn with dollar
payoﬀs proportional to the ﬁeld payoﬀs. The payoﬀs for each 50-50 lottery were chosen
so that the expected payoﬀ of each lottery increases as one moves clockwise (from $33 to
$47.5), but so does the variance of the payoﬀs. This pattern is only violated as one moves
from the $4|$91 lottery to the $0|$95 lottery. Here the expected value does not change but
4the variance continues to increase. Using the constant relative risk aversion utility function,
U(x) = x1−r
1−r to evaluate the risk attitudes at which people should be indiﬀerent between any
two neighboring lotteries we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion r that would























The cutoﬀs, therefore, are the following: picking $33|$33 indicates extreme risk aversion,
r > 1.77. Picking $25|$47 indicates 0.82 ≤ r ≤ 1.77, $18|$62 indicates 0.48 ≤ r ≤ 0.82,
$11|$77 indicates 0.28 ≤ r ≤ 0.48, $4|$91 indicates 0 ≤ r ≤ 0.28, and picking $0|$95
indicates r ≤ 0 or possible risk seeking.
The lotteries were implemented in the ﬁeld using bags of balls. The participants were
told that they were to choose a lottery from the ring and that each lottery represented a bag
with ten balls inside. Each of the six bags was comprised of ﬁve high value balls and ﬁve
low value balls. Once the participant chose a lottery, she then blindly picked a ball from the
corresponding bag and earned the payoﬀ from this choice.
Participants then make choices from three rings where the setup is slightly altered. In
the ambiguity treatment, the possible outcomes of the lotteries are the same but the chances
of either the good or bad outcome are uncertain. Instead of six bags with ﬁve high and ﬁve
low value balls for sure, participants were told that each bag had three high value balls and
three low value balls for sure, but they were not told the distribution of the remaining four
balls. This meant that the probability of the good outcome was uncertain; it was somewhere
between 3/10 and 7/10. This choice was presented to the participants using the graphic in
Figure 2.
In the loss treatment, motivated by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979),
participants began with an endowment of $50 and then chose from the six lotteries in Figure
3. As one can see, if you add $50 to each payoﬀ, you get back to the baseline, Figure 1.
This means that the only thing that has changed is the framing of the decision problem.
The purpose is to investigate whether participants react diﬀerently when losses are possible
compared to the baseline.
In the Pooling treatment, participants reconsidered the decision task in Figure 1 only
this time they were asked if they wanted to pool their risk. Speciﬁcally, participants were
told that they could join a pooling group in which all the payoﬀs from the poolers would be
combined and each pooler would get a 1/n share of the total earnings. If they decided to
5not pool, the game was identical to a replay of the baseline. The order of decisions was as
follows: decide to pool or not, learn the number of poolers in the group, decide on a lottery
from Figure 1 without communicating with each other. In this treatment we examine if
people are willing to join an insurance program and if they respond optimally to the fact
that risks are now pooled when they make their lottery choices.
Clearly risk averse participants should decide to pool in the last treatment. Given the
outcomes of the lotteries are completely independent, the probabilities of really good and
really bad outcomes fall, even in groups of two. In other words, even though the expected
payoﬀ will not change, risk will fall for poolers. Consider two-person groups as an illustration.
Going it alone, the moderately risk averse person who picks the $18|$62 in the baseline and
must have 0.48 ≤ r ≤ 0.82 earns expected utility of 1
2[(181−r)/(1 − r)] + 1
2[(621−r)/(1 − r)]
which will be lower than what she plans on receiving in a two-person group, 1
4[(181−r)/(1 −
r)] + 1
2[(401−r)/(1 − r)] + 1
4[(621−r)/(1 − r)], for any allowable r.
The seemingly harder decision problem is which lottery to pick once one has joined a
pooling group. The ﬁrst thing to notice, however, is that because the pooling arrangement
will force everyone to have the same payoﬀ in the group, strategic motivations are mute
and the problem is the same as what a social planner would choose. If we maintain the
same two-person group example and assume common knowledge of symmetric underlying
risk attitudes, the predictions of what choices participants should make is relatively straight-
forward. Given our parameterization, a simple heuristic arises: compared to your ﬁrst risky
choice, if you pool, pick the next riskiest lottery. A group of two players who chose $11|$77
in the baseline, for example, would do best to pick $4|$91 in the pooling task and the logic
is simple. If pooling reduces our risk a little, our preferences should cause us to compensate
by picking a lottery with slightly more risk and higher expected value.
At the end of the last activity one of the four activities was randomly selected to be paid,
and while one monitor calculated individual earnings and called each of the participants for
payment (privately), the rest of the monitors interviewed the participants for detailed infor-
mation about their background and opinions towards various dimensions of social exclusion.
One advantage of our sample, other than size, is that we strove to make the city sub-
samples representative. Other studies have looked cross-culturally (Henrich et al., 2001;
Henrich et al., 2006) at samples from mostly isolated small-scale societies, or samples of
college educate people in urban settings (Herrman et al., 2008). We went to great lengths
to stratify our sample based on economic position, education, gender and age in large urban
Latin American cities.
To reduce any idiosyncratic errors that might result from variation in the participants’
ability to read, the post-experiment surveys were administered by a group of hired pollsters
6trained for this purpose. Each city team agreed to sample more than 500 participants
from their cities, and conduct more than 25 sessions. The local team in each city designed a
stratiﬁed sample from the population of their cities, based on socio-economic class, education,
gender and age as criteria. In the end 3109 people participated in the six cities providing
a unique data set that combines detailed data from their socio-economic and demographic
background with behavioral data from their decisions during the experiments. This is, as
far as we know, the most comprehensive experimental dataset gathered for Latin America
given the number of countries included, the completeness of the demographics, the sample
sizes and the replicability of the designs in each city.
Each of the city teams conducted sessions of various group sizes from 9 to 38 people with a
mean size of 22 people in each session. All of the sessions followed a common protocol with the
same sequence of activities. The measures of well-being that we collected were listed above
and Table 1 summarizes, by city, the features on which the samples were stratiﬁed, along
with other information about our participants. Most of the variables are intuitive; however,
some require more description. Because incomes, wealth and instances of poverty diﬀer
by city, we normalized each participant’s Socio-economic Class into one of three economic
classes: low status, middle status, high status. This categorization was based on the social
stratiﬁcation used by each city for classifying neighborhoods by income. These stratiﬁcations
are used when assigning utility rates (e.g., electricity), for example with the goal of charging
higher rates to higher income neighborhoods thus subsidizing low income neighborhoods.
However, some cities have more categories than others: Buenos Aires and San José have
three categories, Caracas and Montevideo have four, Lima has ﬁve and Bogotá has six. To
make these comparable across cities, we grouped levels for cities that had more than three
levels into the respective low, middle and high socio-economic classes.
College is an indicator foreducation and takes the value of 1 if the participant has achieved
a college degree or more education. The two Heritage indicators are 1 if the participant self-
reports indigenous or African ancestry. We measure two characteristics of the participant’s
home. Home Size is measured by the number of bedrooms and we measure the earning
power of the household by asking for the number of Income Earners in the home. Lastly,
we ask two questions about socio-economic exclusion. No Access to Credit is an indicator
which is 1 if the participant has not been able to get a loan in the past ﬁve years and No
Access to Politics takes the value 1 if the participant has been excluded from participating
in the political process in the past ﬁve years.
With the help of Table 1, we can summarize our participants. Overall our participants
were 56% female, 31% were married, only 2% had been to college, 2% revealed indigenous
heritage and another 2% claimed African heritage. In addition, 23% said that they had no
7access to credit, if needed but only 4% said they had absolutely no access to the political
process; in other words, surprisingly few felt completely disenfranchised. On average, our
participants were 37 years old, they had slightly more than one child and they lived in homes
with about two and a half bedrooms and two income earners.
3 An Overview of the Experimental Data
Considering the lottery choices, our results appear to be in accordance with previous studies
(e.g., Binswanger, 1980 or Barr and Genicot, 2008): all of the lotteries are chosen to some
degree but some are clearly chosen more often than others.1 In the risky baseline, the
modal choice is $25|$47 which demonstrates considerable risk aversion. Ordering the lotteries
clockwise from one to six, the average choice in the baseline is 2.80 which puts the average
closest to the $18|$62 gamble.
Based on the pseudo-experiment conducted by Ellsberg (1961) and the subsequent work,
we expected that participants would react, on average, more conservatively (i.e., risk aversely)
in the ambiguous choice treatment. Indeed, there is some shift from the more risky lotteries
to the less risky ones in the ambiguity treatment. Although the shape of the distribution
does not change dramatically, the average choice falls to 2.66 which is statistically signiﬁcant
(t = 5.26, p < 0.01) because of the large size of our sample. Indeed, ambiguity causes the
average participant to choose “safer” lotteries.
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) posits that losses are treated diﬀerently
than gains. In particular, anchored at some reference point people tend to be more risk
seeking in the loss domain than in the gain domain. We see that our loss treatment triggers
substantial movement towards riskier lotteries. The average choice climbs to 3.23 which is
again highly signiﬁcant (t = 12.99, p < 0.01) compared to the baseline. The distribution of
choices also changes substantially. There appears to be more bifurcation in the loss choice
distribution: the mode is the safe $33|$33 lottery but there is now, compared to the baseline,
more than twice as many people choosing the $0|$95 lottery.
As suggested above, pooling should cause people to choose more risky lotteries because
the reduced risk associated with the insurance can be oﬀset by choosing lotteries with higher
expected values. Indeed, the average choice is 2.86 which is higher (more risk seeking) than
the baseline but the diﬀerence is only signiﬁcant at the 5% level (t = 2.16, p = 0.03). At
the same time, if we consider only those participants who chose to pool, the average choice
is 2.94 and the diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant (t = 3.62, p < 0.01).
1As hoped we found considerable variation in the lotteries chosen in the baseline risk task: 23% of
participants “played it safe” and chose $33 for sure, 30% picked the $25|$47 lottery, 19% picked $18|$62,
11% picked $11|$77, 8% picked $4|$91 and the remaining 9% picked $0|$95.
8Given the breadth of our study, we can also disaggregate our data to see if choices vary
by location. Figure 4 presents pie charts to summarize the lottery choice data by treatment
and city. In panel (a) we conﬁrm that the $25|$47 gamble is the modal choice in the baseline
risk instrument for more than half of the cities. While there appears to be variation across
cities (e.g., more than half of the choices in Buenos Aires, Montevideo and San José were
for one of the two safest lotteries while $18|$62 was a common choice in Bogota and Lima),
using the simple system of assigning integers to the lotteries and calculating t-statistics
suggests that the only strong result is that the participants in Caracas picked signiﬁcantly
more risky lotteries than in any other location (p < 0.01 for each comparison). This basic
result is conﬁrmed by the ordered probit regressions reported in the appendix (Table A1)
where we also control for the individual characteristics summarized in Table 1. Focusing on
the safe choice, we see that Venezuelan participants are 6.2% less likely to pick the $33|$33
lottery than the Colombian participants (p < 0.01), a result that is repeated for all the other
comparisons with Caracas (at p = 0.02 or better).
There appears to be more variation by location in panel (b) of Figure 4 which illustrates
the choices when the probabilities are ambiguous. It is still the case that the choices in
Caracas are more risk seeking than in the other locations and the diﬀerences are signiﬁcant
according to t-tests (at p < 0.01) with one exception: choices in the ambiguity task do not
appear to diﬀer between Caracas and San José, perhaps because participants in San José
did not react as strongly to ambiguity as the other participants did. This lack of a Costa
Rican response to ambiguity also means that diﬀerences arise between San José and two other
locations, Bogotá and Buenos Aries (p < 0.01 in both cases). We ﬁnd corroborating evidence
in Table A1 which shows that Venezuelan participants were 9.9% less likely (p < 0.01) and
Costa Rican participants were 4.9% (p < 0.10) less likely to pick the safe $33|$33 lottery
than were the Colombian participants.
In panel (c) of Figure 4 we report the city-level choices from the instrument that allowed
losses. This appears to be the treatment where the largest diﬀerences emerge between cities.
Not only are the choices in Caracas more risky than in Bogotá (p = 0.02), Buenos Aries
(p < 0.01) and San José (p = 0.07) according to simple t-tests, San José also appears more
conservative with losses than Montevideo (p = 0.08) and less conservative than Buenos
Aries (p = 0.07). Further, participants in Buenos Aires take fewer risks with losses than
both Lima (p = 0.01) and Montevideo (p < 0.01) and the participants in Montevideo also
take more risks than those in Bogotá (p = 0.02). Table A1 suggests that Venezuelan decision
makers are 5% (p < 0.05) less likely to pick the safe $33|$33 lottery than their Colombian
counterparts and that the point estimates are also signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between Buenos
Aires and Caracas (p < 0.01), Lima (p < 0.10), and Montevideo (p < 0.01).
9Lastly, we present the results from the risk pooling treatment in panel (d) of Figure 4.
As noted above, overall people tend to choose slightly riskier lotteries in this treatment,
as they should to take advantage of the pooled risk. The city-level responses to pooling
seem remarkably homogenous across cities because exactly the same diﬀerences that arose
in panel (a) are signiﬁcant in panel (d). Speciﬁcally, participants in Caracas chose more risky
lotteries in the pooling treatment than in any other location according to simple t-statistics
(the highest p-value was 0.07 in the comparison with Bogotá) and the other diﬀerences are not
signiﬁcant. While the coeﬃcient on Caracas is not signiﬁcant in Table A1, the diﬀerence in
point estimates between Buenos Aries and Caracas is signiﬁcant (p = 0.03) after controlling
for individual characteristics.2
It is easier to visualize individual diﬀerences between the treatments by taking diﬀer-
ences. To create a measure of “ambiguity aversion” we again order the lotteries one through
six and take the diﬀerence in behavior between the ambiguity treatment and each player’s
baseline risky choice. If the diﬀerence (ambiguity-risk) is negative the participant behaves
more cautiously in ambiguous situations and if it is positive she is more risk seeking under
uncertainty. We created a measure of “loss aversion” by taking the diﬀerence between the
second treatment and the baseline (loss-risk). People are loss averse (i.e., the diﬀerence is
positive) in the sense that they shy away from certain losses and, in doing so, are willing to
incur more risk when losses are possible. For the risk pooling behavior in the last task we
created the willingness to take on risk when pooling by calculating the diﬀerence between
the pooling response and the baseline (pooling-risk). People respond “optimally” by taking
on more risk once they have chosen to pool, particularly if they increase the risk by one
lottery.
In Figure 5 we summarize the city-level diﬀerences in our three more nuanced measures
of risk-taking behavior. On average, people in all six cities tend to make diﬀerent, but
consistent, choices in the treatments. Ambiguity generates a relatively homogeneous response
(blue circles). People tend to be more risk averse when the situation is ambiguous (ambiguity-
baseline<0) and this tendency is similar in all the locations although the diﬀerence between
our participants from Bogotá and those from San José is signiﬁcant (t = 2.34, p = 0.02).
There also tends to be a behavioral diﬀerence when losses are at stake. In accordance with
previous ﬁndings (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), people tend to be more risk seeking when
losses are at stake (i.e., they shy away from certain losses). Compared to the ambiguity
diﬀerence, people tend, in all locations, to be relatively more averse to certain losses and
there seems to be more variation in this response by location. The citizens of Montevideo
2There is one other robust ﬁnding to note from Table A1. Female participants were between 3.4% and
5.9% more likely to chose the safe $33|$33 lottery in each of the treatments (p < 0.01 in all cases).
10appear to be extremely loss averse compared to those from Buenos Aires which is strange
considering the proximity of the two experimental locations. Lastly, we also see that, on
average, people react as expected to the risk pooling treatment. If they pool, they then tend
to pick riskier lotteries. This result becomes even more interesting when we recall that the
risk-pooling decision was made in private, without coordinating or communicating with the
rest of the group. Further, pooling tends to generate the most homogeneous response across
cultures.3
4 Simple Risk and Well-being
The ﬁrst step in our analysis is to replicate what others have done: does our measure of
risk aversion correlate with well-being? In Figure 6 we introduce two of our well-being
measures. In the top panel, we assess the likelihood of being in the top of three “economic
classes” (EC) as a function of the participant’s lottery choice. In the bottom panel of Figure
6 we create a similar graph using “relative wealth” (RW) instead of economic class. Our
relative wealth measure is novel in that we asked each participant to imagine where she
stood on an economic ladder with ten rungs (so that those at the top of the economy were
on the tenth rung). In other words, what was the participant’s evaluation of her relative
economic position in society? Combined, these two measures of well-being give us objective
and subjective rankings. Further, these measures are correlated, both overall and at the city
level. The 95% conﬁdence intervals of the 1 to 10 subjective scale for each objective class are
[3.92, 4.17] for the low class, [4.94, 5.09] for the middle class and [5.80, 6.03] for the upper
class.
According to the conjecture that motivates our work, the bar height in the two panels of
Figure 6 should increase from left to right because the gambles are arrayed from extremely
risk averse ($33|$33) to risk neutral or risk seeking ($0|$95) and more risk tolerant people
should be better oﬀ. Although the top panel of Figure 6, which uses economic class, appears
to roughly conform to the conjecture in that the two highest risk gambles are associated with
higher probabilities of being in the upper class, the bars associated with the 95% conﬁdence
intervals hint that not many of these diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant. In addition,
the bottom panel, in which subjective evaluations are used, demonstrates tighter conﬁdence
intervals but the diﬀerences in the means are also smaller. So, again, there does not appear,
based on simple tests, to be a signiﬁcantly increasing relationship between one’s tolerance
for risk and well-being.
3Although a few demographics (e.g., gender and having children) are robustly associated with the be-
havioral diﬀerences driven by our treatments, to not distract from the main point of our analysis, we simply
present a table of regression results in the appendix (Table A2) for the interested reader.
11Adding six more measures of well-being and using multiple regressions to control for
other factors that might explain some of the variance in economic outcomes, makes our ﬁrst
step analysis more comprehensive. To economic class and relative wealth, we add a variety
of measures that broaden the analysis from wealth to well-being, more generally. The inclu-
sions are an indicator for home ownership (56% aﬃrmative), an indicator for participants
who report having all three basic services: electricity, piped water, trash collection (93%
aﬃrmative), an indicator for being employed (58% aﬃrmative), the level of family expendi-
tures measured as multiples (1-7) of the local minimum wage, an indicator for not receiving
any government assistance (64% aﬃrmative) and an indicator for never having lost a busi-
ness to bankruptcy (94% aﬃrmative). The last two measures were transformed to have the
same, positive, frame as the others.
Methodologically, our regression strategy was to be as agnostic as possible about the
speciﬁcation by creating indicator variables for each of the six lotteries. If the data conform
to the conjecture that people who are more tolerant of risk are better oﬀ then we should
see that the coeﬃcients on the lottery indicators are increasing in magnitude as the lotteries
represent more risk tolerance (just like the bar heights should have increased monotonically
in Figure 6).
Table 2 summarizes the results of eight regressions (which are reported in detail in the
appendix, Table A3) and multiple coeﬃcient comparisons.4 The lottery choices are arrayed
along the top and side of the table. The acronyms entered in the table indicate the domain
for which the regression was run. NRA, for example, indicates the regression in which the
indicator for not requiring government assistance was the dependent variable. All entries
indicate that the coeﬃcient on the row lottery was statistically signiﬁcantly greater (at the
10% level or better) than the coeﬃcient on the column lottery. Thus, entries below the
diagonal are consistent with more risk tolerance being associated with higher well-being. At
the same time, entries above the diagonal are evidence of the opposite trend: greater risk
tolerance being associated with lower well-being.
Overall, the evidence in Table 2 suggests that there is almost as much evidence that
well-being decreases with risk tolerance as there is suggesting the opposite. There are a few
domains of well-being that seem to be most in line with the conjecture. When not receiving
government assistance (NRA) is the dependent variable, one more risky lottery ($25|$47)
4For the binary outcome variables (home ownership, employment, not requiring government assistance,
having not lost a business) the regressions use the probit estimator. For the basic services and economic
class regressions ordered probit is used and the marginal eﬀects for being in the highest group (having all
three basic services or being in the highest of three classes) are reported. Because the dependant variable is
truncated at one and ten in the case of relative wealth and at one and seven for expenditures as multiples
of minimum wages, we use the tobit estimator in these two cases. In each case, the standard errors are
clustered at the session level.
12has a greater coeﬃcient than the baseline, safe $33|$33 lottery. While not all the coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, after controlling for other factors, Table 2 indicates that there is
some evidence that the well-being measures depicted in Figure 4 (EC and RW) increase with
risk-taking. However, considering the entries for EC and RW above the diagonal, it might
be that the relationship is not monotonic; a U-shape seems to be a slightly better ﬁt. Very
risk averse people and risk-neutral people do the best economically, those with moderate risk
aversion may do worse. Nevertheless, these results should not be overstated because there
are many empty cells in Table 2 suggesting that the signiﬁcant diﬀerences are not terribly
robust. In sum, with a very large sample and a lot of important controls we ﬁnd only limited
evidence for the conjecture that more risk tolerance corresponds to higher well-being.
At the same time, a closer inspection of the full regressions reported in appendix Table
A3 reveals interesting correlations between some of our controls and the outcome measures.
Of most interest, perhaps, is that social exclusion, measured in our case as not getting loans
or not having access to political campaigns is associated with lower well-being. The strong
eﬀect of credit is particularly interesting because it is a factor that we deemed important
to control for and is often absent from tests of the relationship between preferences and
outcomes. Additionally, it is not surprising (but conﬁrming of our survey) to ﬁnd that
in ﬁve of the eight domains, having a college education or more is associated with higher
well-being.
5 Ambiguity, Losses, Risk Pooling and Well-being
As hinted at in the introduction, we can take another, more nuanced, second step in our
analysis because of the additional treatments we conducted to identify several biases that
now regularly appear in the empirical and theoretical decision-making literatures. Perhaps
it is not simple risk aversion that correlates with well-being; maybe biases that arise as the
decision environment gets closer to the sort of conditions encountered in real life will be more
closely associated with well-being. Few real world decisions, apart from those encountered
in the casino, involve pure risk. Instead of knowing all the possible outcomes and the
probabilities associated with those outcomes, many decisions are made under uncertainty
when the important parameters are ambiguous — you often do not know what the chances
of an outcome occurring are for sure (e.g., Engle-Warnick et al., 2008). In addition, real
world lotteries usually involve both gains and losses and it is now reasonable to expect that
people treat losses diﬀerently from gains. Lastly, people in the real world occasionally make
risky choices as part of a group instead of alone. Having groups set up insurance schemes by
pooling their risky choices should cause individuals to reconsider their individual choices.
13If there is no clear relationship between simple, more traditional, measures of risk aversion
and economic outcomes, do the more nuanced measures correlate better? In Table 3 we
report the results of a conservative test of the extent to which these additional preference
measures are associated with well-being. The results are conservative in that we control for
a number of other factors, we cluster standard errors at the session level to account for the
idiosyncrasies that may occur during individual sessions and, despite the resulting inﬂated
standard errors due to possible multicolinearity, we force the three measures to compete
“head-to-head” to explain the variation in well-being.
Following Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005) who argue that ambiguity aversion can only be un-
derstood in reference to one’s risk aversion, we use the diﬀerence in behavior between the
treatments and the risky baseline as our preference measures. We also allow for the rela-
tionship between preferences and outcomes to be “kinked” by using a spline speciﬁcation.
Instead of assuming that the relationship between preferences and outcomes will be the same
regardless of whether people act more or less conservatively to the treatments, we allow the
slope to change at the origin. Hence, there are six independent variables of interest reported
in Table 3: accepting less or more risk in the treatment compared to the baseline for each
of the three treatments. Speciﬁcally, for each of the well-being measures, WBi, we use the
following speciﬁcation:
WBi = β0 + β1(Ambiguityi − Riski) + β2 max{Ambiguityi − Riski,0}
+β3(Lossi − Riski) + β4 max{Lossi − Riski,0} + β5(Pooli − Riski)
+β6 max{Pooli − Riski,0} + β7Xi + ǫi
where Xi is a vector of controls and ǫi is an error term. Risk, Ambiguity, Loss, and
Pool are the lottery choices ordered from no risk to possible risk seeking (i.e., clockwise
from one to six) and the diﬀerence is the treatment eﬀect. As in our discussion of Figure
5, Ambiguity-Risk is our measure of ambiguity aversion, Loss-Risk is our measure of loss
aversion and Pool-Risk is our measure of the net eﬀect of pooling on behavior. Because
these measures can be positive or negative, the max portions of the speciﬁcation allow those
who are more conservative in the treatments (those for whom the diﬀerence is negative) to
have diﬀerent outcomes than those who behave more risk seeking in the treatments. To see
this, simply think about the marginal eﬀects. For someone who behaves more conservatively
in the ambiguity treatment than in the baseline, the diﬀerence will be negative and the eﬀect
of this diﬀerence on well-being will be captured by β1 alone because β2 will be multiplied by
zero. A person with a positive diﬀerence (who sought more risk under ambiguity) will have
the eﬀect β1 + β2.
14The results of running these regressions for each of the eight well-being measures are
collected in appendix Table A4. One will notice that these results are diﬀerent from those
reported in the Table 3 because we use the above speciﬁcation to calculate the more intuitive
point estimates of the sums β1 + β2, β3 + β4, and β5 + β6 and standard errors, which again
are clustered by session, reported in Table 3.
As one can see, each of the domains of well-being appears to be associated with at
least one of our preference measures. In this broad sense, the more nuanced protocols
have already performed better than the standard risk measure. Instead of focusing on the
details of Table 3 and the subtleties of each domain, can we recognize any broad patterns in
these results? When it matters (Basic services, Relative wealth, Not requiring government
assistance, Not having lost a business), one’s estimated reaction to ambiguity tends to be
associated concavely with well-being. For convenience, these relationships are graphed in
Figure 7 where the horizontal axis of each graph measures the relative tolerance towards
ambiguity against the baseline risk aversion measure. The thick solid red lines indicate that
the slope is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level or better and thin dashed black
lines indicate insigniﬁcant eﬀects. Figure 7 suggests that those people who react extremely
to ambiguity, in either direction, are less well oﬀ. Speciﬁcally, people who reacted very
conservatively in the ambiguity treatment compared to the baseline are less likely to have
all the basic services and tend to have lower relative wealth. At the same time, those who
react in a risk seeking manner when the gamble is ambiguous tend to get more government
assistance and are more likely to have lost a business.
Reactions to losses, graphed in Figure 8, are also signiﬁcantly correlated with well-being
in four domains (Home ownership, Basic services, Relative wealth, Expenditures) and, in
contrast to the ambiguity results, the relationship tends to be more convex. Now those at
the extremes are better oﬀ. In particular, those participants who act more risk aversely when
losses are at stake tend to have higher home ownership rates, more basic services and higher
subjective assessments of their relative wealth.
As seen in Figure 9, one’s behavioral diﬀerence in the risk pooling treatment is associated
with well-being in all but one domain (having lost a business). Like ambiguity, the general
relationship between pooling and well-being tends to be concave. Again, those at the ex-
tremes do worse. In particular, those who react contrary to theory have lower well-being.
Recall that theory suggests that even risk averse poolers should pick the next risky lottery.
Being more conservative in the pooling treatment (instead of more risk seeking) is associated
with lower likelihoods of home ownership, having all the basic services, being in the highest
class and requiring government assistance. These people also tend to have more modest
assessments of their relative wealth and lower expenditures.
15Returning to Table 3 we see another important result that supports the validity of our
indicators and introduces the possibility of institutional barriers along with the behavioral
ones. Speciﬁcally, perceived limits to one’s ability to get credit are also a strong predictor of
well-being in six of our eight domains. Having limited access to credit correlates with being
5.4% less likely to own a home, 4.9% less likely to be in the highest of three economic classes,
5.9% more likely to need government assistance, 5% more likely to have lost a business to
bankruptcy, and to have subjective assessments that are 7% less and 23% less than the
average of one’s relative income and of one’s expenditures, respectively.5
6 Discussion
There is a long tradition in economics and public policy of assuming that people are poor
because they have attitudes and preferences that keep them from saving and investing in
projects that can improve their well-being. Our research takes aim at the assumed link
between preferences and outcomes.
Our ﬁrst step is to compile the most comprehensive sample of experimentally-induced
risk attitudes in Latin America gathered to this point. Looking at summary behavior from
this sample further suggests that our procedures are valid in that we replicate a number
of standard biases found in the literature. Comparing across locations we ﬁnd that our
Venezuelan participant in Caracas tended to incur the most risk, our Colombian participant
in Bogota reacted the most to ambiguity, our Uruguayan participants in Montevideo reacted
most loss aversely, and the largest fraction of participants to react optimally to risk pooling
occurred in Buenos Aries.
Our second step is to use a large sample of incentivized participants and a broader set
of well-being measures to replicate previous results that have used standard risk aversion
instruments. We ﬁnd little evidence of robust links between risk aversion and well-being.
In our third step we analyze the results of three diﬀerent treatments that add elements of
reality to the decision problem to see if these, more subtle, instruments correlate better with
well-being. Indeed they do, even after controlling for a variety of other important factors like
human capital accumulation and access to credit. Not only are there signiﬁcant links between
responses to ambiguity, losses and pooling, the links array themselves in interesting patterns
that should spark new areas of research. For example, we ﬁnd that people with extreme
relative reactions to ambiguity do worse. Of particular interest is that people who seek risk
in ambiguous situations may tend to subject themselves and their families to too much risk
5As one can see, the returns to a college education also come through in Table A4. These people are
5% more likely to have all the basic services, 14% more likely to be employed, 41% more likely to be in the
highest economic class and perceive themselves to have relatively more wealth and expenditures.
16in their daily lives because these people are more likely to need government assistance and
are more likely to have lost a business.
Our loss and pooling results are equally interesting. Concerning behavioral responses to
the possibility of losses, in studies conducted in labs on college campuses most people seek
risk when losses are at stake. We replicate this in the ﬁeld: 75% of our participants tolerated
more or the same amount of risk in the loss treatment. However, while much of the focus
of previous research has been on the majority of the population who seek risk, our ﬁndings
suggest that it is the other participants, those that react very conservatively to losses, who
are more interesting. These people are more likely to own their own homes, have a full set
of basic services and perceive themselves to be of higher economic stature.
Our risk pooling results are interesting because they suggest that those participants who
reduce their risk tolerance instead of increasing it, in other words those that do not take
advantage of the insurance aspect of pooling, do signiﬁcantly worse in ﬁve of the eight
domains. This result alone seems important in the development context because so much
attention has been paid to risk pooling strategies in rural agriculture and, taken alone, our
risk pooling results should be the impetus for new research.
Finally, as interesting and important as the behavioral results are, another, more unin-
tended, yet important, theme emerges in our data. While the primary goal of this project
was to test the extent to which risk preferences and their more contextually relevant variants
correlate with economic well-being, we also wanted to control for social exclusion, particu-
larly one’s access to credit. As it turns out, perceived credit hindrances appear to matter
robustly and have eﬀects that are (roughly) of the same magnitude as our behavioral re-
sults. Given preferences and credit access compete “head-to-head” in our analysis, these
results go a long way to inform one standard critique of what we are calling the “Fisher
hypothesis”: that preferences do not matter, it is malfunctioning credit markets that may
keep people poor. Indeed, in our data both preferences (albeit not simple risk preferences)
and access to credit correlate with well-being, however, only credit access appears to do so
robustly and systematically. This is particularly relevant for the context of developing coun-
tries where access to the formal banking sector remains limited. In this regard, our results
suggest lessons about the use of ﬁnancial mechanisms that seem to create Pareto enhancing
behavior such as moderate increases in risk tolerance when risk can be pooled that might
also have implications for the design of microﬁnance programs.
While our results are substantial because of the quality and variety of our risk measures,
the size and representativeness of our sample and the amount of controls that we have gath-
ered, there is still one important issue that cannot be adequately resolved by our study and
will need to be addressed in future research. We have been able to establish correlations
17between various measures of behavior in risky situations and a number of outcome vari-
ables, but we cannot, with this sample, conﬁdently determine the direction of causality. Do
preferences cause well-being as is assumed by much of the existing theoretical literature or
do the preferences of people change with their economic circumstances? To untangle these
relationships will require econometric instruments that can be used to predict preferences
but are only correlated with outcomes because of their causal eﬀect on preferences. Clearly,
this will be a “hard nut to crack” and more work will be required to develop convincing
instruments.
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20Figure 1. The decision task (with representative U.S. dollar payoﬀs) used to assess attitudes
towards risk. Participants are asked to choose one of six 50-50 lotteries in which the odds of
a high payment are the same as the odds of a low payment. As one moves clock-wise around
the ring, the lotteries increase in risk and expected payoﬀ except for the last lottery which
has the same expected payoﬀ as the ﬁfth but is riskier. The participant’s risk attitude can
be bound by the chosen lottery. To determine payoﬀs for the task, the experimenter uses a
bag of ﬁve low value balls and ﬁve high value balls where the ball values are determined by
the chosen lottery and the participant blindly picks a ball from the bag.
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$0     $95 $33    $33
$4     $91
$11    $77 $18    $62
$25    $47
Figure 2. The decision task (with representative U.S. dollar payoﬀs) used to assess attitudes
towards ambiguity. Participants were asked to choose one of six lotteries in which the odds
of a high or low payment are bound between 3/10 and 7/10 but are unknown.
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Figure 3: The decision task (with representative U.S. dollar payoﬀs) used to assess attitudes
towards losses. Participants were asked to choose one of six lotteries in which the odds of a
high or low payment are equalized but some payoﬀs are negative. However, the only diﬀerence
in this task and the risky task in Figure 1 is the frame; if one adds the $50 endowment for

































Bogota Buenos Aires Caracas Lima Montevideo San Jose


































Bogota Buenos Aires Caracas Lima Montevideo San Jose

































Bogota Buenos Aires Caracas Lima Montevideo San Jose


































Bogota Buenos Aires Caracas Lima Montevideo San Jose
Panel (d): Pooler Choices.
Figure 4. The distribution of lottery choices by location and treatment.









Figure 5. City level diﬀerences in treatment responses. Circles represent the city-level
mean diﬀerence in ambiguous lottery choice from the risky baseline. Squares represent mean
diﬀerences when losses are possible and diamonds represent mean diﬀerences of poolers when
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Figure 6. Simple measures of risk tolerance and well-being. Both panels represent the rela-
tionship between lottery choices and well-being. In the upper panel well-being is measured
by the objective criteria of neighborhood wealth (probability of being in the top of three
classes). In the lower panel well-being is measured by participant subjective evaluations of
their relative wealth compared to others in their city (on a scale from 1 to 10).
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Figure 7. Well-Being and Ambiguity. Each panel 
graphs the estimated relationship between 
individual reactions to ambiguity and the eight 
dimensions of well-being. Solid red lines indicate 
sides of the spline that are significant at the 10% 
level or better. Each specification controls for 
pooling in the shared risk task, gender, age, 
college, married, ethnicity, home size, children, 
income earners, access to credit and access to the 
political process.
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Figure 8. Well-Being and Losses. Each panel 
graphs the estimated relationship between 
individual reactions to potential losses and the 
eight dimensions of well-being. Solid red lines 
indicate sides of the spline that are significant at 
the 10% level or better. Each specification 
controls for pooling in the shared risk task, 
gender, age, college, married, ethnicity, home size, 
children, income earners, access to credit and 
access to the political process.
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Figure 9. Well-Being and Pooling. Each panel 
graphs the estimated relationship between 
individual reactions to the ability to pool risks 
and the eight dimensions of well-being. Solid red 
lines indicate sides of the spline that are 
significant at the 10% level or better. Each 
specification controls for pooling in the shared risk 
task, gender, age, college, married, ethnicity, 
home size, children, income earners, access to 
credit and access to the political process.
29  Bogotá Buenos Aires Caracas Lima Montevideo San José Overall
Socio-economic Class
% low 42 33 21 15 19 26 26
% mid 44 34 54 75 56 53 53
% high 14 33 25 10 25 21 21
Female (indicator) 0.58 (0.49) 0.51 (0.50) 0.55 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50) 0.61 (0.49) 0.56 (0.50)
Age (years) 36.50 (13.29) 39.64 (15.20) 33.66 (12.54) 34.82 (12.87) 41.31 (15.99) 37.25 (15.88) 37.27 (14.58)
College (indicator) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10) 0.05 (0.21) 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.04) 0.03 (0.18) 0.02 (0.14)
Married (indicator) 0.24 (0.43) 0.41 (0.49) 0.27 (0.44) 0.28 (0.45) 0.33 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47) 0.31 (0.46)
Children (number) 1.27 (1.17) 0.86 (1.17) 1.11 (1.21) 1.28 (1.33) 0.78 (1.00) 1.35 (1.36) 1.10 (1.22)
Indigenous Heritage (indicator) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.12) 0.02 (0.14) 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.14)
Black Heritage (indicator) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.08) 0.05 (0.22) 0.01 (0.12) 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.16)
Home Size (bedrooms) 2.66 (1.03) 2.28 (0.96) 3.06 (1.20) 2.64 (1.34) 2.25 (0.90) 2.93 (1.38) 2.62 (1.18)
Income Earners (number) 1.91 (1.05) 2.01 (0.99) 2.30 (1.11) 2.18 (1.24) 2.00 (0.97) 1.94 (1.17) 2.06 (1.10)
No Access Credit (indicator) 0.32 (0.47) 0.17 (0.37) 0.35 (0.48) 0.26 (0.44) 0.10 (0.30) 0.21 (0.41) 0.23 (0.42)
No Access Politics (indicator) 0.06 (0.23) 0.01 (0.11) 0.03 (0.17) 0.05 (0.22) 0.02 (0.14) 0.07 (0.25) 0.04 (0.19)
N (participants) 567 498 488 541 580 435 3109
Sessions 31 25 25 28 28 22 159
Mean Session Size 21 20 20 23 22 26 22
Table 1. Summary statistics of participant characteristics by city (standard deviation).
30  $33|$33 $25|$47 $18|$62 $11|$77 $4|$91 $0|$95
$33|$33 - HO EM, EC RW
$25|$47 NRA - EM, EC RW BS
$18|$62 - RW NLB
$11|$77 - NLB
$4|$91 EC EC, RW -
$0|$95 EM RW NLB -
Table 2. Does well-being increase with risk tolerance? The diﬀerent lotteries are represented
on the columns and rows. All entries indicate that the row lottery has a signiﬁcantly larger
coeﬃcient at the 10% level than the column lottery. The shaded entries below the diagonal
therefore suggest that being more tolerant of risk is associated with higher well-being in the
relevant domain. Entries above the diagonal indicate that being less tolerant of risk (i.e.,
more risk aversion) is associated with higher well-being. The coeﬃcients come from regres-
sions that control for gender, age, college education, married, ethnicity, home size, number
of children, number of income earners, access to credit and access to the political process.
The key for the well-being domains is: HO = Home ownership, BS = Basic services, EM
= Employed, EC = Economic class, RW = Relative wealth, NRA = Not require assistance,
EX = Expenditures and NLB = Never lost a business.
31 
Home Basic Employment Economic Relative Not Require Expenditures Not Lost
Ownership Services Class Wealth Assistance a Business
[indicator] [Pr(all 3)] [indicator] [Pr(high)] [unit interval] [indicator] [# min wages] [indicator]
Accept Less Risk under Ambiguity 0.010 0.040** -0.008 -0.001 0.069* -0.009 0.009 0.001
(0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.010) (0.038) (0.012) (0.031) (0.011)
Accept More Risk under Ambiguity -0.003 -0.012 0.016 -0.001 0.045 -0.025* -0.021 -0.020**
(0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.011) (0.046) (0.013) (0.029) (0.010)
Accept Less Risk with Losses -0.037*** -0.032** -0.011 0.012 -0.072** 0.008 0.011 -0.001
(0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.035) (0.013) (0.032) (0.010)
Accept More Risk with Losses -0.006 -0.013 0.001 -0.003 -0.063** -0.008 -0.036* -0.008
(0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.026) (0.010) (0.022) (0.008)
Accept Less Risk in Group 0.021* 0.032* 0.017 0.018* 0.104*** 0.030** 0.072** 0.003
(0.012) (0.018) (0.015) (0.010) (0.036) (0.013) (0.032) (0.010)
Accept More Risk in Group 0.001 -0.022 -0.025** -0.014* 0.007 0.002 0.014 0.003
(0.010) (0.016) (0.013) (0.009) (0.034) (0.012) (0.025) (0.008)
No Access to Credit -0.054*** -0.008 -0.013 -0.049*** -0.349*** -0.059** -0.309*** -0.050***
(0.022) (0.009) (0.018) (0.015) (0.071) (0.026) (0.067) (0.012)
No Access to Politics -0.008 -0.038* -0.063 -0.014 -0.056 -0.145** 0.018 -0.017
(0.051) (0.021) (0.044) (0.028) (0.154) (0.062) (0.119) (0.021)
R
2 or pseudo R
2 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05
p-value from Chi
2 or F test <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Observations 3087 3087 2169 3082 3086 2418 2810 3087
Table 3. Risk attitudes and well-being. Each column refers to a diﬀerent aspect of well-
being. The regressions are splines to allow reactions to diﬀer depending on whether or not
one reacts more or less conservatively to the treatments. The splines are estimated with
either OLS, Probit, Ordered Probit or Tobit depending on the restrictions on the dependent
variable. The standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the session level. Marginal
eﬀects are reported instead of coeﬃcients. The speciﬁcation for each characteristic includes
controls for pooling in the shared risk task, gender, age, college education, married, ethnicity,
home size, number of children, number of income earners, access to credit and access to the
political process. ***, **, * indicate signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
32  Risk Choice Ambiguous Choice Loss Choice Pooling Choice
Buenos Aires 0.011 -0.005 0.034 0.034
(0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.031)
Caracas -0.062*** -0.099*** -0.050** -0.032
(0.019) (0.020) (0.025) (0.028)
Lima 0.004 -0.022 -0.015 0.012
(0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.029)
Montevideo 0.015 -0.031 -0.022 0.007
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.030)
San Jose 0.010 -0.049* -0.007 -0.029
(0.031) (0.029) (0.027) (0.036)
Female 0.034*** 0.056*** 0.059*** 0.047***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018)
Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003 -0.001**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
College -0.021 -0.001 -0.019 -0.064
(0.044) (0.053) (0.035) (0.042)
Married 0.020 0.037** 0.048*** 0.030
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023)
Children -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Indian Heritage -0.021 -0.034 -0.060* 0.004
(0.037) (0.041) (0.035) (0.067)
African Heritage -0.018 -0.016 -0.036 0.017
(0.032) (0.032) (0.039) (0.044)
Home Size -0.006 -0.006 0.002 -0.011
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Income Earners 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
No Access to Credit -0.013 -0.029* -0.013 -0.049***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019)
No Access to Politics 0.009 -0.037 0.065* 0.014
(0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.046)
Observations 3088 3089 3089 1482
Psuedo R-Squared 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.006
Table A1. The demographic determinants of preferences. Ordered probit results reporting
probabilities of choosing the safe $33|$33 lottery. Bogotá is the baseline. (Standard errors)
have been clustered at the session level. *** indicates signiﬁcant at the 1%, ** 5% and *
10% levels.
33  More Conservative More Conservative More Conservative
under Ambiguity with Losses in Group
[indicator] [indicator] [indicator]
Buenos Aires -0.064** -0.012 -0.062***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.021)
Caracas -0.065** 0.012 -0.065***
(0.028) (0.032) (0.024)
Lima -0.013 -0.017 0.004
(0.033) (0.026) (0.021)
Montevideo -0.067** -0.028 -0.052**
(0.029) (0.028) (0.022)
San Jose -0.077** 0.004 0.005
(0.030) (0.031) (0.021)
Pool Risk 0.056*** 0.020 0.021
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
Female 0.039*** 0.047*** 0.043***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.015)
Age -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
College 0.010 -0.097 -0.044
(0.054) (0.053) (0.057)
Married -0.017 0.029 -0.003
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Children 0.011 0.012* 0.008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Indian Heritage -0.019 -0.035 0.066
(0.060) (0.054) (0.059)
African Heritage 0.043 -0.004 0.091*
(0.050) (0.049) (0.057)
Home Size -0.003 0.006 -0.001
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Income Earners 0.001 -0.012 -0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
No Access to Credit -0.013 -0.004 -0.009
(0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
No Access to Politics -0.052 0.054 -0.007
(0.042) (0.046) (0.041)
Observations 3090 3090 3090
Psuedo R-Squared 0.010 0.010 0.013
Table A2. The demographic determinants of preferences. For each regression a dummy
variable has been created to indicate those people who choose lower risk lotteries in the
three treatments. (Standard errors) have been clustered at the session level. *** indicates
signiﬁcant at the 1%, ** 5% and * 10% levels.
34 
Home Basic Employment Economic Relative Not Require Expenditures Not Lost
Ownership Services Class Wealth Assistance a Business
[indicator] [Pr(all 3)] [indicator] [Pr(high)] [unit interval] [indicator] [# min wages] [indicator]
Lottery $25|$47 -0.045* -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.046* 0.044 -0.001
(0.026) (0.008) (0.022) (0.014) (0.007) (0.026) (0.062) (0.011)
Lottery $18|$62 -0.022 -0.01 -0.047* -0.031** -0.006 -0.024 -0.005 0.003
(0.031) (0.010) (0.028) (0.016) (0.008) (0.034) (0.074) (0.013)
Lottery $11|$77 -0.048 -0.012 -0.002 -0.025 -0.035*** 0.045 -0.043 0.008
(0.035) (0.012) (0.030) (0.018) (0.010) (0.035) (0.084) (0.012)
Lottery $4|$91 -0.048 -0.023 -0.001 0.036 0.014 0.02 0.044 -0.024
(0.037) (0.015) (0.034) (0.026) (0.014) (0.041) (0.108) (0.019)
Lottery $0|$95 -0.049 -0.016 0.035 0.008 0.006 0.031 -0.049 0.001
(0.038) (0.013) (0.027) (0.024) (0.011) (0.043) (0.093) (0.014)
Pool Risk -0.018 -0.005 0.019 -0.001 -0.003 -0.036 -0.026 -0.019**
(0.019) (0.005) (0.016) (0.014) (0.006) (0.023) (0.047) (0.008)
Female -0.010 -0.005 -0.084*** 0.003 0.005 0.028 0.020 0.019**
(0.020) (0.006) (0.016) (0.012) (0.006) (0.022) (0.049) (0.008)
Age 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** -0.001 -0.002*** 0.001 -0.005 -0.001***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
College 0.026 0.039*** 0.139** 0.428*** 0.135*** 0.025 1.197*** 0.039
(0.064) (0.006) (0.022) (0.064) (0.023) (0.105) (0.123) (0.014)
Married 0.011 0.016*** 0.029 0.053*** 0.043*** 0.076*** 0.467*** 0.009
(0.020) (0.006) (0.019) (0.018) (0.008) (0.024) (0.056) (0.009)
Children -0.026*** -0.016*** -0.003 -0.046*** -0.02*** -0.088*** -0.108*** -0.006**
(0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.010) (0.023) (0.003)
Indian Heritage 0.044 0.001 0.001 -0.022 -0.057*** 0.019 -0.195 0.044**
(0.072) (0.023) (0.063) (0.043) (0.017) (0.063) (0.145) (0.010)
African Heritage -0.035 -0.002 0.006 -0.079*** -0.057*** -0.044 -0.109 0.043*
(0.055) (0.014) (0.058) (0.025) (0.020) (0.066) (0.131) (0.011)
Home Size 0.113*** 0.025*** -0.024*** 0.037*** 0.025*** -0.033*** 0.263*** 0.001
(0.012) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.013) (0.031) (0.004)
Income Earners 0.033*** 0.002 0.071*** 0.020*** 0.010*** 0.030*** 0.109*** (0.003)
(0.013) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.012) (0.030) (0.004)
No Access to Credit -0.053** -0.011 -0.007 -0.039*** -0.030*** -0.100*** -0.148** -0.046***
(0.022) (0.008) (0.017) (0.014) (0.007) (0.027) (0.064) (0.011)
No Access to Politics 0.035 -0.023 -0.062 -0.002 0.007 -0.087 0.121 -0.018
(0.052) (0.017) (0.045) (0.027) (0.015) (0.062) (0.109) (0.021)
Observations 3088 3088 2170 3083 3087 2418 2811 3088
Psuedo R-Squared 0.095 0.170 0.082 0.058 0.050 0.180 0.078 0.066
Table A3. Simple risk and well-being. Each column represents the regression of a diﬀerent
well-being measure on the set of independent variables. Each regression includes unreported
location ﬁxed eﬀects. (Standard errors) are clustered at the session level. *** indicates
signiﬁcant at the 1%, ** 5% and * 10% levels.
35 
Home Basic Employment Economic Relative Not Require Expenditures Not Lost
Ownership Services Class Wealth Assistance a Business
[indicator] [Pr(all 3)] [indicator] [Pr(high)] [unit interval] [indicator] [# min wages] [indicator]
Ambiguity - Risk 0.009 0.007** -0.007 -0.003 0.053 -0.012 0.011 -0.004
(0.012) (0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.037) (0.013) (0.028) (0.005)
max{Ambiguity - Risk, 0} -0.009 -0.010** 0.018 0.001 -0.002 -0.007 -0.022 -0.009
(0.019) (0.005) (0.016) (0.011) (0.062) (0.019) (0.041) (0.007)
Loss - Risk -0.036*** -0.004 -0.009 0.009 -0.059* 0.015 -0.003 -0.001
(0.012) (0.003) (0.011) (0.008) (0.035) (0.013) (0.030) (0.005)
max{Loss - Risk, 0} 0.033** 0.003 0.010 -0.012 0.006 -0.014 -0.043 -0.004
(0.015) (0.004) (0.014) (0.011) (0.045) (0.018) (0.041) (0.007)
Pooling - Risk 0.014 0.006* 0.012 0.012* 0.091*** 0.016** 0.061** 0.002
(0.012) (0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.036) (0.010) (0.030) (0.004)
max{Pooling - Risk, 0} -0.011 -0.011** -0.028** -0.022** -0.085* -0.009 -0.042 -0.004
(0.017) (0.005) (0.014) (0.010) (0.053) (0.019) (0.044) (0.006)
Pool Risk -0.019 -0.002 0.021 0.001 0.030 -0.035 0.018 -0.016**
(0.020) (0.005) (0.015) (0.014) (0.058) (0.024) (0.048) (0.008)
Female -0.011 -0.004 -0.086*** 0.002 0.050 0.031 0.026 0.020***
(0.020) (0.006) (0.015) (0.012) (0.055) (0.021) (0.048) (0.008)
Age 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** -0.001 -0.016*** -0.001 -0.005** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
College 0.024 0.038*** 0.139** 0.421*** 1.332*** 0.022 1.187*** 0.038
(0.065) (0.006) (0.023) (0.064) (0.227) (0.110) (0.124) (0.015)
Married 0.011 0.016*** 0.030 0.053*** 0.439*** 0.076*** 0.466*** 0.008
(0.020) (0.006) (0.019) (0.018) (0.080) (0.024) (0.055) (0.009)
Children -0.027*** -0.016*** -0.005 -0.045*** -0.285*** -0.088*** -0.105*** -0.006**
(0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.027) (0.010) (0.023) (0.003)
Indian Heritage 0.047 0.005 0.004 -0.021 -0.575*** 0.013 -0.199 0.043*
(0.072) (0.023) (0.065) (0.044) (0.165) (0.065) (0.145) (0.010)
African Heritage -0.031 -0.001 -0.003 -0.082*** -0.549*** -0.047 -0.092 0.043*
(0.055) (0.013) (0.061) (0.024) (0.195) (0.065) (0.131) (0.011)
Home Size 0.113*** 0.024*** -0.025*** 0.037*** 0.246*** -0.033** 0.262*** 0.001
(0.012) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.035) (0.014) (0.031) (0.004)
Income Earners 0.034*** -0.002 0.071*** 0.019*** 0.101*** 0.029** 0.107*** -0.003
(0.012) (0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.030) (0.012) (0.030) (0.004)
No Access to Credit -0.054*** -0.011 -0.005 -0.037*** -0.317*** -0.100*** -0.154** -0.046***
(0.022) (0.008) (0.018) (0.014) (0.069) (0.027) (0.064) (0.011)
No Access to Politics -0.031 -0.025 -0.060 -0.003 -0.013 -0.078 0.118 -0.015
(0.051) (0.017) (0.044) (0.028) (0.150) (0.062) (0.110) (0.020)
R
2 or pseudo R
2 0.096 0.178 0.081 0.058 0.050 0.181 0.079 0.069
p-value from Chi
2 or F test <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Observations 3087 3087 2169 3082 3086 2418 2810 3087
Table A4. Treatment diﬀerences and well-being. Each column refers to a diﬀerent aspect of
well-being. The regressions are splines to allow reactions to diﬀer depending on whether or
not one reacts more or less conservatively to the treatments. The splines are estimated with
either OLS, Probit, Ordered Probit or Tobit depending on the restrictions on the dependent
variable. All regressions include location ﬁxed eﬀects. The standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered at the session level. Marginal eﬀects are reported instead of coeﬃcients. ***,
**, * indicate signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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